Charles W. Johnson Lieutenant, Dental Corps U.S. Navy Convicted Sex Offender Sodomy Upon A Child

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Name: Charles W. Johnson AKA Charles Johnson DDS

Case: United States v. Johnson No. 96-0669 (1996) Crim. App. No. 94-1674 (1994)

Date Of Appeal: February 4, 1997 , September 10, 1999

Plea: Guilty

Charges: Sodomy Upon A Child

Military Branch: U.S. Navy

Listed In National Sex Offenders Registry? NO

Cox, Chief Judge:

Pursuant to his pleas, appellant, a naval officer and dentist, was convicted by a military judge sitting as a general court-martial at Camp Pendleton, California, of committing oral sodomy upon his son, a child under the age of 16 (2 specifications), taking indecent liberties with his son by showing him pornographic movies, and committing indecent acts upon his son, violations of Articles 125 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 925 and 934, respectively.

He was sentenced to a dismissal and 3 years' confinement. Pursuant to the terms of a pretrial agreement, the convening authority suspended the confinement but approved the dismissal.

After appellant's court-martial, his commanding officer, Captain Staiger, twice recommended to the convening authority that appellant's dismissal be suspended and that appellant not be administratively separated because "his retention ... would be in the best interest of his family and in the best interest of the Navy." The defense claims that Captain Staiger later withdrew his recommendation, although there is no evidence of the withdrawal except for appellant's statements in his sworn declaration.

Prior to the convening authority's action, the Chief of Naval Personnel's legal counsel, Captain Becker, USN, wrote a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel located in Washington, D.C. In that memorandum, Captain Becker advocated that child molesters who engage in homosexual conduct with children and adolescents "fall under mandatory processing for homosexual acts." The memorandum specifically mentions that appellant was expected to receive a "full commutation" from the convening authority.

The convening authority, Major General Reinke, based upon the pretrial agreement, suspended confinement for 2 years and ordered the execution of the sentence as adjudged with the exception of the dismissal and confinement. The convening authority was stationed at Camp Pendleton, California.

When appellant raised this issue, the convening authority provided an affidavit stating that he was "not influenced or even aware of" the internal advisory memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. He further stated that he never indicated he would be willing to suspend appellant's dismissal if appellant's commanding officer personally endorsed the action.

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that appellant offered only assertions and speculation of command influence. Unpub. op. at 2. That court affirmed the findings and the sentence.

Appellant has not met his burden in this case. He has not even met the first prong of the test for command influence. Specifically, the internal memorandum directed to the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel in Washington, D.C. could not have influenced the convening authority located at Camp Pendleton, California.

Appellant has not shown that the convening authority was even aware of the document. In his affidavit, the convening authority specifically denies knowledge of the memorandum. Perhaps appellant would have a closer case if the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel and the convening authority shared an office or, at least, a base, but they do not. As it stands, appellant has not even shown the appearance of unlawful command influence. Unless appellant can show that the convening authority's office somehow obtained that memorandum (for example, by someone faxing it to them, etc.), the facts are simply not sufficient to meet the first prong of the command-influence test.