Chris D. Littlewood Staff Sergeant U.S. Airforce Convicted Sex Offender Indecent Acts With A Minor

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Name:Chris D. Littlewood

Case: United States v. Littlewood No. 99-0604

Date Of Appeal: February 2, 2000

Plea: Guilty

Charges: Indecent acts with a minor

Military Branch: U.S. Navy

Listed In National Sex Offenders Registry? NO

Judge SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

During April of 1997, appellant was tried by a general court-martial composed of a military judge sitting alone at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. He pleaded guilty to one specification of committing indecent acts with a child under 16. He pleaded not guilty to one specification of communicating indecent language to that same child, one specification of taking indecent liberties with her, and one specification of committing indecent acts with another child.

He was found guilty of all the above specifications, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 934. On April 12, 1997, he was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 16 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the rank of E-1. On June 18, 1997, the convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged. On March 11, 1999, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the finding of guilty of committing indecent acts with the second child but affirmed the findings to the remaining specifications relating to the first child. The lower court reassessed the sentence and reduced confinement to 12 years but otherwise affirmed a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and reduction to E-1.

The granted issue asks whether the military judge erred in allowing appellant’s commander to testify over defense objection as to the nature of certain conduct allegedly committed by appellant. LtCol Kopp generally testified that any sexual activity by a military member toward a 12-year-old girl was "indecent" and "prejudicial to good order and discipline," and would "bring discredit upon the Air Force." At trial, appellant objected that such testimony was unqualified opinion testimony, irrelevant, and called for speculation and conclusion on the part of the witness. (R. 443). On appeal, he argues that this opinion testimony was inadmissible because it was not based on personal knowledge, contained legal conclusions, and improperly used hypotheticals.

As noted above, appellant was charged with numerous offenses in violation of Article 134, UCMJ, e.g., indecent language, indecent liberties, and indecent acts with a child. Each offense required a showing of indecency and an additional legal element that the indecent conduct be "to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces" or "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." See paras. 87 and 89, Part IV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.). Judgement on these questions is committed to the factfinder at the court-martial, whether it be a military judge or members. See Article 51(c), UCMJ, 10 USC § 851(c); see generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 748-49 (1974); United States v. Martinez, 42 MJ 327, 331 (1995).

Such error, however, was clearly harmless. Article 59(a), UCMJ. Even a cursory review of the guilty specifications in this case involving a 12-year-old girl and her natural father reveals indecent conduct per se. See United States v. Sanchez, 11 USCMA 216, 218, 29 CMR 32, 34 (1960) (holding certain acts indecent per se where they are shown to be detestable and degenerate acts which clearly evince a wanton disregard for the moral standards generally and properly accepted by society). Moreover, we consider such despicable conduct to "virtually always . . . be prejudicial to good order and discipline and discrediting to the Armed Forces." United States v. Davis, 26 MJ at 449; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (failure to instruct on element of offense could be harmless error where Government’s overwhelming proof of this element was uncontested). Finally, we note that this was a trial by military judge alone, and we presume the trial judge was well aware of his codal responsibility to make his own independent judgement on each of the elements of these offenses. SeeUnited States v. Raya, 45 MJ 251, 253 (1996).

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.